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Abstract
Speech pseudonymization aims at altering a speech signal
to map the identifiable personal characteristics of a given
speaker to another identity. In other words, it aims to hide
the source speaker identity while preserving the intelligibility
of the spoken content. This study takes place in the VoicePri-
vacy 2020 challenge framework, where the baseline system
performs pseudonymization by modifying x-vector informa-
tion to match a target speaker while keeping the fundamental
frequency (F0) unchanged. We propose to alter other paralin-
guistic features, here F0, and analyze the impact of this modi-
fication across gender. We found that the proposed F0 modifi-
cation always improves pseudonymization. We observed that
both source and target speaker genders affect the performance
gain when modifying the F0.
Introduction
In many applications, such as virtual assistants, speech sig-
nal is sent from the device to centralized servers in which
data is collected, processed, and stored. Recent regulations,
e.g., the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) (Par-
liament and Council 2016) in the EU, emphasize on pri-
vacy preservation and protection of personal data. As speech
data can reflect both biological and behavioral characteris-
tics of the speaker, it is qualified as personal data (Nautsch
et al. 2019). The research reported in this paper has been
done in the context of the VoicePrivacy challenge framework
(Tomashenko et al. 2020), which is one of the first attempt of
the speech community to encourage research on this topic,
define the task, introduce metrics, datasets and protocols.
Anonymization is performed to suppress the personally
identifiable paralinguistic information from a speech utter-
ance while maintaining the linguistic content. The task of the
VoicePrivacy challenge is to degrade automatic speaker veri-
fication performance, by removing speaker identity as much
as possible, while keeping the linguistic content intelligible.
This task is also referred to as speaker anonymization(Fang
et al. 2019) or de-identification (Magariños et al. 2017).
Copyright © 2021, Association for the Advancement of Artificial
Intelligence (www.aaai.org). All rights reserved.
Anonymization systems in the VoicePrivacy challenge
should satisfy the following requirements:
• output a speech waveform;
• conceal the speaker’s identity;
• keep the linguistic content intelligible;
• modify the speech signal of a given speaker to always
sound like a unique target pseudo-speaker, while differ-
ent speaker’s speech must not be similar.
The fourth requirement constraints the system to have a one-
to-one mapping between the real speaker identities and a
pseudo-speaker. Such system can be considered as a voice
conversion system where the output speaker identity resides
in a pseudonymized space.
The GDPR defines pseudonymization as: “processing of
personal data in such a manner that the personal data can
no longer be attributed to a specific data subject without the
use of additional information, provided that such additional
information is kept separately and is subject to technical and
organizational measures to ensure that the personal data
are not attributed to an identified or identifiable natural per-
son”(Art.4.5 of the GDPR (Parliament and Council 2016)).
pseudonymization techniques differ from anonymization
techniques. With anonymization, data is modified so that
any information that may serve as an identifier to a subject
is deleted. pseudonymization enhances privacy by replacing
most identifying information within data by artificial iden-
tifiers. Per the requirements imposed by the VoicePrivacy
challenge, and the above definition from GDPR, the chal-
lenge imposes contestants to build pseudonymization sys-
tems. The VoicePrivacy challenge focuses on modifying the
speech characteristics; while keeping the linguistic content
unchanged; hence removing personal information from the
linguistic content is not part of that challenge.
Recently, Fang et al. (Fang et al. 2019) proposed a speech
synthesis pipeline where only the continuous speaker rep-
resentation (the x-vector (Snyder et al. 2018)) is modi-
fied. Linguistic related information necessary to generate
anonymized speech is left untouched. The corresponding
toolchain doesn’t alter the fundamental frequency (F0) in-
put values, and the articulation of speech sounds feature (the
Phoneme Posterior-Grams (PPGs) (Sun et al. 2016)).
The F0 values of speech determine the perceived relative
highness or lowness of the sound, it plays an indispens-
able role for the listener as it helps to perceive a variety
of paralinguistic, and prosodic information (Gussenhoven
2004). Analysis of the F0, which is typically higher in fe-
male voices than in male voices, can be used to characterize
speaker-related attributes.
In this paper, we use the pipeline proposed by Fang et
al. (Fang et al. 2019) in the VoicePrivacy challenge 2020
(Tomashenko et al. 2020), and discuss what possible im-
provement may be obtained by modifying the F0 values.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. First,
we review the baseline framework and explains the conver-
sion process. Secondly we describes the experimental setup.




The VoicePrivacy challenge provides two baseline sys-
tems: Baseline-1 that anonymizes speech utterances using x-
vectors and neural waveform models (Fang et al. 2019) and
Baseline-2 that performs anonymization using McAdams
coefficient (McAdams 1984). Our contributions are based
on Baseline-1 which is referred to as the baseline system in
this paper.
Figure 1: The speaker anonymization pipeline. Modules A,
B and C are parts of the baseline model. We added module
D to modify the F0 values, which are later used by modules
C.
The central concept of the baseline system introduced
in (Fang et al. 2019) is to separate speaker identity and
linguistic content from an input speech utterance. Assum-
ing that those information are disentangled, an anonymized
speech waveform can be obtained by altering only the fea-
tures that encode the speaker’s identity. The anonymization
system illustrated in Figure 1 breaks down the anonymiza-
tion process into three groups of modules: A - Feature ex-
traction comprises three modules that respectively extract
fundamental frequency, PPGs like bottleneck features, and
the speaker’s x-vector from the input signal. Then, B -
Anonymization derives a new pseudo-speaker identity us-
ing knowledge gleaned from a pool of external speakers.
Finally, C - Speech synthesis synthesizes a speech wave-
form from the pseudo-speaker x-vector together with the
original PPGs features, and the original F0 using an acous-
tic model (Tomashenko et al. 2020) and a neural waveform
model (Wang, Takaki, and Yamagishi 2020). For all utter-
ances of a given speaker, a single target pseudo-speaker is
used to modify the input speech. This strategy, described as
perm in (Srivastava et al. 2020b), ensures that a one-to-one
mapping exists between the source speaker identity and the
target pseudo-speaker.
x-vector pseudonymization
Given the baseline system, where only the x-vector identity
is changed, the selection algorithm used to derive a pseudo-
identity plays an important role. Many criteria can be cho-
sen to select the target pseudo-speaker identity. Recent re-
search made by (Srivastava et al. 2020a) has outline multi-
ple selection techniques for the VoicePrivacy Challenge. The
baseline’s pseudo-speaker selection is performed by averag-
ing a set of x-vectors candidates from the speaker pool. The
candidate x-vectors are selected by retrieving the 200 fur-
thest speakers given the original x-vector. From this subset
of 200 x-vectors, a set of 100 x-vectors is randomly chosen
to create the pseudo-speaker x-vector. Speaker’s distances
are queried according to the probabilistic linear discriminant
analysis (PLDA). The speaker pool is composed of speakers
from the LibriTTS-train-other-500 (Zen et al. 2015) dataset.
This dataset is not used elsewhere in our experiments.
Gender selection
Information conveyed by the x-vector embeddings can be
used for other tasks than speaker recognition/verification.
Work by (Raj, Snyder, and Povey 2019) has shown that ses-
sion and gender information, along with other characteris-
tics, are also encoded in x-vectors.
The aforementioned x-vector anonymization procedure
is designed to select a pseudo-speaker identity from the
same gender as the source speaker. Constraining the x-vector
anonymization procedure to target x-vectors from same gen-
der as the source is referred to as Same, While constraining
the selection to target the opposite gender is referred to as
Opposite. Same, and Opposite gender selection were exper-
imentally studied by (Srivastava et al. 2020a). Work on gen-
der independent selection still needs to be done.
In this paper, we focus our experience on Same and Oppo-
site gender selections. We discuss the impact that F0 modi-
fication has on female and male speakers when using these
two selection algorithms.
Speech synthesis
The speech synthesizer (cf. pipeline C in Figure 1) in the
the VoicePrivacy baseline system is composed of a speech
synthesis acoustic model, used to generate mel-fbanks fea-
tures; and a vocoder, used to generate a speech signal. The
vocoder used in the baseline is a Neural Source-Filter (NSF)
Waveform model (Wang, Takaki, and Yamagishi 2020). NSF
models uses the F0 information to produce a sine-based
excitation signal that is later transformed by filters into a
waveform. Manipulating the F0 values will impact both
the speech synthesis acoustic model and vocoder models to
transform the speech signal.
F0 modification
In the VoicePrivacy baseline, the F0 values extracted from
the source speech are directly used (unchanged) by the
speech synthesizer pipeline (acoustic model and neural
vocoder), even though a different target pseudo-speaker
was selected. Multiple works have investigated F0 con-
ditioned voice conversion (Bahmaninezhad, Zhang, and
Hansen 2018; Huang et al. 2020; Qian et al. 2020; Ueda
et al. 2015). In some papers modifying the F0 improves the
quality of the converted voice. Motivated by those results,
we propose to modify the F0 values of a source utterance
from a given speaker (cf. module D in Figure 1) by using
the following linear transformation:




where xt represents the log-scaled F0 of the source speaker
at the frame t, µx and σx represent the mean and stan-
dard deviation for the source speaker. µy and σy represents
the mean and standard deviation of the log-scaled F0 for
the pseudo-speaker. The linear transformation and statisti-
cal calculation are only performed on voiced frames. The
mean and standard deviation for the target pseudo speaker
are calculated by averaging information from the same 100
speakers selected to derive the pseudo-speaker x-vector.
Experimental setup
Data
All experiments where based on the challenge publicly
available baseline1. The development and evaluation sets
are built from LibriSpeech test-clean. The pool of external
speakers on which x-vectors and F0 statistics are computed
is LibriSpeech train-other-500. Additional information on
the number of speakers, and the gender distributions can be
found in the evaluation plan (Tomashenko et al. 2020).
Attack models
One of the requirements of the VoicePrivacy challenge is to
conceal the speaker’s identity. To assess the robustness of
anonymization systems, two attack models were designed
(cf. evaluation plan). The first scenario consists of a user
who publishes anonymized speech and an attacker who
uses one enrollment utterance of non-anonymized (original)
speech to compute a linkability score. In this scenario (re-
ferred as o-a in Figure 2), the goal is to ensure the original
speaker identity is not the same as the one in the gener-
ated anonymized speech. Performant systems are expected
to show low linkability. The second scenario consists of a
user who also publishes anonymized speech, but this time,
the attacker has itself anonymized an enrollment utterance
using the same exact anonymization pipeline except for the
random seed. This scenario (referred as a-a in Figure 2) is
defined as a Semi-Informed attacker in work done by (Srivas-
tava et al. 2020b). Hence, the pseudo-speaker correspond-
ing to a given speaker in the enrollment set is differ-
ent from the pseudo-speaker corresponding to that same
1https://github.com/Voice-Privacy-Challenge
speaker in the trial set, as mentioned in Section 3.3 of the
evaluation plan. Consequently, we also expect to have low
linkability in this a-a scenario even through the attacker has
gained some knowledge about the anonymization system.
Utility and linkability metrics
To evaluate the performance of the system in both linkability
(speaker’s concealing capability) and utility (content intel-
ligibility) two systems are used. To assess the linkability, a
pre-trained x-vector-PLDA based Automatic Speaker Verifi-
cation (ASV) system provided by the challenge organizers is
used. The privacy protection is measured in terms of Cminllr as
this measure provides an application-independent (Brummer
and Preez 2006) evaluation score. As the Equal Error Rate
(EER) measure is more often used in speaker verification,
we present our result in terms of both EER and Cminllr . Those
metrics are computed using the cllr toolkit2 of the challenge.
For the utility, a pre-trained Automatic Speech Recognition
(ASR) system provided by the challenge organizers is used
to decode the anonymized speech and compute the Word Er-
ror Rate (WER%). In this challenge, the WER% measure is
used to evaluate how the content is kept intelligible. Both
ASR and ASV systems are trained on LibriSpeech train-
clean-360 using Kaldi (Povey et al. 2011). The higher the
EER/Cminllr , the better the systems are capable of “conceal-
ing a speaker identity”. The lower the WER% is, the more
intelligible the anonymized speech is.
Experimental results
All results are compared to the VoicePrivacy baseline sys-
tem. The pseudonymization pipeline with F0 modification
contribution is publicly available3. Figure 2 details the
speaker linkability scores for original to anonymized (o-
a) ASV tests, and for anonymized to anonymized (a-a)
ASV tests in different gender selection and F0 modifica-
tion setups. The original to anonymized test case helps to
assess how capable systems are at modifying the origi-
nal speech to make it sound like another speaker’s speech.
As the system used to evaluate the linkability between
original and anonymized speech is domain-dependent (Sri-
vastava et al. 2020b), and only trained on the original
speech, it is thus of no surprise that the baseline provided
in the challenge already shows great results. As for the
anonymized to anonymized test, enrolling the ASV system
with anonymized data brings some speaker information in
the process, although the pseudo-speaker x-vector is not ex-
actly the same between random and trial utterances, because
of the random part of the x-vector selection process (see Sec-
tion on x-vector pseudonymization above). Given this evalu-
ation framework, our goal is to further degrade the linkabil-
ity in both attacks models. For each anonymization pipeline





Figure 2: EER (%) score obtained by the ASV evaluation
system on Librispeech tests sets. The Cminllr score is dis-
played on the top of each bar. Multiple pipelines setups are
reported for the gender selection and F0 modification. o –
original, a – anonymized speech data for enrollment and trial
parts. Entry “Same gender - Original F0” corresponds to the
challenge baseline system.
Male linkability
In the original to anonymized attack scenario (o-a in Fig-
ure 2), we can observe that the proposed F0 modification
doesn’t affect the already good male un-linkability perfor-
mance when compared to the challenge’s baseline (“Same
gender - Modified F0” compared to “Same gender - Origi-
nal F0”). It appears that selecting an x-vector from the oppo-
site gender without applying the F0 modification always de-
grades the pseudonymization un-linkability (“Opposite gen-
der - Original F0” compared to “Same gender - Original
F0”). Applying the F0 modification together with the op-
posite gender x-vector selection doesn’t improves perfor-
mance. This limitation might come from the x-vector selec-
tion algorithm, where the furthest speakers are selected to
derive the pseudo-identity.
Regarding the anonymized to anonymized attack scenario
(a-a in Figure 2). Using the baseline anonymization setup,
the attacker is able to re-identify the user at a much higher
degree. On their own, the F0 modification always improves
compared to the baseline performance. Jointly selecting the
opposite gender and applying the F0 modification appears to
be an excellent design choice against this attacker.
Female linkability
Contrary to the male results, the proposed F0 modification
always improves the pseudonymization for female speaker
in the original to anonymized attack scenario. This effect
is observed regardless of the gender’s x-vector selection
(“Same gender - Modified F0” compared to “Same gender
- Original F0” and “Opposite gender - Modified F0” com-
pared to “Opposite gender - Original F0”). Applying both
the F0 modification and the opposite x-vector selection beats
the baseline system.
The anonymized to anonymized attack scenario draws
similar conclusions as for the male speaker. Jointly modi-
fying gender for the x-vector selection and applying the F0
modification always improves pseudonymization. It is worth
noting that female speakers are more sensitive to F0 modifi-
cation than males. Meaning, the source’s gender information
plays a role in choosing the best anonymization procedure.
Speech intelligibility
Gender-selection F0 Test WER%
Same Original 6.73Modified 6.92
Opposite Original 7.24Modified 6.74
Table 1: Speech recognition results in terms of WER% for
the LibriSpeech test set.
Across all experiments, the utility (Table 1) is not tremen-
dously affected by the gender x-vector selection, F0 modifi-
cation, or the two modifications applied together. The high
WER% score (7.24) reported with the opposite x-vector gen-
der selection, and no F0 modification might come from the
fact that the ASR model used for the evaluation was trained
on audiobooks data; and the fact that selecting opposite gen-
der without modifying F0 might leads to some inconsisten-
cies in the speech signal.
Conclusions
In this work, we proposed to alter the F0 paralinguistic infor-
mation in an x-vector based speech pseudonymization sys-
tem. We evaluated this modification against the Opposite
and Same gender x-vector target selection to obtain various
anonymization setups. We objectively evaluated the F0 mod-
ification using the VoicePrivacy 2020 challenge tools. The
performance was assessed in terms of EER/Cminllr to mea-
sure privacy protection and WER% to measure utility. We
observed that keeping the original F0 values retains some in-
formation about the original speaker. The experiments show
that applying the F0 modification and selecting an x-vector
from the Opposite gender allows for better privacy protec-
tion against attackers who has access to the anonymiza-
tion pipeline. Our results also show that the performance of
anonymization depends on the gender of the source. This
raises the question of the importance of personalized modi-
fication in a privacy context. In future work, we plan to sub-
jectively evaluate the naturalness of the generated speech.
We think the F0 modification helps to produce a more nat-
ural speech when an Opposite gender’s x-vector is selected.
Because the F0 features will be coherent with the selected
gender.
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